Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).

On 24 August 2017, Messrs Park, Olde and Hansell were appointed joint and several administrators of SurfStitch Group Limited. Prior to their appointment, two shareholder class actions were commenced against SurfStitch. The administrators identified 3,313 shareholders who may be potential group members in the class actions.

The bar for recovering assets that have been dubiously transferred out of an insolvent company may not be as high as one might think.

Background

On 14 June 2016, in its judgment delivered in Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia confirmed that a benefit transferred from a company without authority can only be retained by the recipient in very limited circumstances.

Update on McCabes' article " 'Are we there yet' - When are proceedings over for the purposes of enforcement"

The High Court of Australia has refused an application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Sarks v Cassegrain [2015] FCAFC 38, confirming that a judgment issued by the Court on the basis of filing of a certificate of costs assessment is a "final judgment" for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and can therefore ground a bankruptcy notice.